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Abstract. Because of the threat of advanced multi-step attacks, it is of-
ten difficult for security operators to completely cover all vulnerabilities
when deploying remediations. Deploying sensors to monitor attacks ex-
ploiting residual vulnerabilities is not sufficient and new tools are needed
to assess the risk associated to the security events produced by these sen-
sors. Although attack graphs were proposed to represent known multi-
step attacks occurring in an information system, they are not directly
suited for dynamic risk assessment. In this paper, we present the Bayesian
Attack Model (BAM), a Bayesian network-based extension to topologi-
cal attack graphs, capable of handling topological cycles, making it fit for
any information system. Evaluation is performed on realistic topologies
to study the sensitivity of its probabilistic parameters.
Keywords: Bayesian Attack Model, dynamic risk assessment, topological at-
tack graph, cycle management, Bayesian network
1 Introduction
Managing the security of Information Systems (IS) is increasingly complex, due
to the numerous security mechanisms that are implemented, and the significant
amount of dynamic data produced by security enforcement points. In critical en-
vironments, security operators generally know most of the vulnerabilities of their
IS thanks to regular vulnerability scans. Unfortunately, many vulnerabilities are
not patched, either because patching may disrupt critical services, or because
they are not a priority for system administrators. As a second line of defence,
security operators deploy sensors (e.g., Host or Network Intrusion Detection
Systems) generating alerts when an attacker attempts to exploit such vulnera-
bilities. As these security events are produced, operators need to evaluate the
risk brought by ongoing attacks in their system, to respond appropriately: this
process is called dynamic risk assessment (DRA) [14].
The most impacting attacks are composed of several successive exploitation
steps. Several models have been proposed to formalize such multi-steps attacks.
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An attack graph is a model regrouping all the paths an attacker may follow in an
information system. It has been first introduced by Phillips and Swiler in [18].
A study of the state of the art about attack graphs compiled from early liter-
ature on the subject has been carried out by Lippmann and Ingols [12], while
a more recent one was made available by Kordy et al. [10]. Topological attack
graphs are based on directed graphs. Their nodes are topological assets (hosts,
IP addresses, etc.) and their edges represent possible attack steps between such
nodes [8]. Attack graphs are generated with attack graph engines. There are
three main attack graph engines: (1) MulVAL, the Multi-host, Multi-stage Vul-
nerability Analysis Language tool created by Ou et al. [15], (2) the Topological
Vulnerability Analysis tool (TVA) presented by Jajodia et al. in [8,9] (commer-
cialized under the name Cauldron) and (3) Artz’s NetSPA [2]. Attack graphs
are attractive because they leverage readily available information (vulnerability
scans and network topology). However, they are not adapted for ongoing attacks,
because they can not represent the progression of an attacker nor be triggered
by alerts. Thus, they must be enriched to provide the functionalities needed to
perform Dynamic Risk Assessment, for example using Bayesian networks.
A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model introduced by Judea
Pearl [16]. It is based on a Directed Acyclic Graph, where nodes represent
random variables, and edges represent probabilistic dependencies between vari-
ables [3]. For discrete random variables, these dependencies can be specified
using a Conditional Probability Table associated with each child node. Bayesian
networks are particularly interesting for computing inference, i.e. calculating
the probability of each state of all nodes of the network, given some evidences,
i.e. nodes that have been set to a specific state. Inference can be done efficiently
using the algorithm of Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter [11]. A Bayesian attack graph,
introduced by Liu and Man in [13] is an extension of an attack graph based on a
Bayesian network, constituted of nodes representing a host in a specific system
state (a true state means that the host is compromised) and edges representing
possible exploits that can be instantiated from a source host to a target host.
The major concern of building such a Bayesian network from an attack graph
is due to the structure of a Bayesian network that must be acyclic, while at-
tack graphs almost always contain cycles. To avoid cycles, Liu and Man assume
that an attacker will never backtrack once reaching a compromised state, but do
not detail how such assumption is used to build the model. In [6], Frigault and
Wang use Bayesian inference in Bayesian Attack Graphs to calculate security
metrics in an information system. Xie et al. present in [21] a Bayesian network
used to model the uncertainty of occurring attacks. The Bayesian attack graph
is enhanced with three new properties: separation of the types of uncertainty,
automatic computation of its parameters and insensitivity to perturbation in the
parameters choice. This model also adds nodes dedicated to dynamic security
modelling: an attack action node models whether or not an attacker action has
been performed, a local observation node models the inaccuracy of observations.
In this paper, we propose a new model combining attack graphs and Bayesian
networks for DRA. It is built from the knowledge security operators have about
their IS: network topology, known vulnerabilities and detection sensors. Then, we
change the states of the sensor nodes according to the security events received.
This model is capable of representing the attacks that may occur (vulnerabil-
ities) and the ones ongoing (alerts). It outputs probabilities that attacks have
succeeded and that assets of the IS may have been compromised. With respect
to the current state of the art, our contributions are twofold. First, we provide
an explicit model and process for handling cycles. This process is supported by a
clear definition of a set of model parameters. The sensitivity of the model toward
these parameters is studied in the validation. Second, we provide a significant
performance improvement in terms of number of nodes and vulnerabilities over
the existing state of the art. While classic Bayesian attack graph models are
usually demonstrated over a few nodes and vulnerabilities, we show that our
model can be realistically computed at the scale of an enterprise IS.
This paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we formally define the struc-
ture and the conditional probability tables of our Bayesian Attack Model built
from a topological attack graph. Section 3 validates the results of the Bayesian
Attack Model on a realistic use case and analyses its sensitivity toward the prob-
abilistic parameters. Section 4 compares our work with the related work, before
concluding and presenting future work, in Section 5.
2 The Bayesian Attack Model
Given the advantages brought by Bayesian Attack Graphs, they provide a strong
foundation for dynamic security modelling. Our proposal extends Bayesian Net-
works to be used for DRA with real-scale IS.
The Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) described all along this section is built
from a Topological Attack Graph, which is described in section 2.1, and a set
of detection alerts. The BAM is composed of submodels called Bayesian Attack
Trees (BAT). BAT and BAM are described in section 2.3. Each BAT is composed
of a sequence of attack steps, typed nodes linked together. They are described
in section 2.2. The probabilistic relations between nodes of a BAT are described
in conditional probability tables whose content is detailed in section 2.4.
2.1 Topological Attack Graph
The BAM is built from a topological attack graph.
Definition 1. A topological attack graph is a directed graph TAG(TN,AS):
– TN = {TNi, i ∈ {1..N}} is a set of N topological nodes: the assets of an
information system,
– AS is a set of attack steps, the edges that represent the fact that an attack
allows the attacker to move from the parent topological node to the child
topological node.
• Each attack step has a type of attack, describing how the attacker can
move between nodes (exploitation of a vulnerability, credential theft, etc.).
• Depending on the type of attack, each attack step is associated with a set
of conditions [c].
• Some attack steps are associated with a sensor that may raise an alert
indicating that this attack has been detected.
A TAG can be generated with an attack graph engine such as MulVAL [15] or
TVA [9]. Topological nodes represent, for example, an IP address or a computer
cluster. Attack steps are, for example, the exploitation of a vulnerability.
Definition 2. A condition c is a fact that needs to be verified, for an attack
step to be possible. It is associated with a probability of success P(c).
The condition fact is, for example, “a vulnerability is exploited on the desti-
nation host”. For such conditions, in our experiments, we use an approximation
of the probability of successful exploitation using information coming from the
Exploitability Metrics of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [5].
It is deduced from (1) the Attack Complexity (AC), (2) Privileges Required
(PR), (3) and User Interaction (UI) values, as well as the Attack Vector (AV),
which is taken into account when constructing the topological attack graph.
Definition 3. A sensor s of an attack step is an oracle issuing an alert when
the attack step has been detected. It is associated with a false negative and a false
positive rates.
A sensor represents, for example, an Intrusion Detection System, a System
Event Management, or a human report.
Grouping attack steps In topological attack graphs, there may exist many
attack steps between two topological nodes. Attack steps can be of different
types, depending on the attack (cf. Definition 1). Generally, there are very few
possible types of attack steps (e.g., the remote exploitation of a vulnerability on
a server). In order to reduce the size of the model, while preserving information,
we group all attack steps of the same type between two topological nodes into a
single vertex with (1) a new condition: a multivariable boolean function (usually,
an OR) of all conditions applying to the grouped attack steps; (2) an attached
sensor node activated only when the boolean function of grouped sensors is true.
When several conditions ci of an attack step as are grouped in one condition
c, we define the probability of successful exploitation associated with this new
condition. For example, when grouping several conditions ci “a vulnerability
is exploited on the destination host” into one new condition c “at least one
vulnerability of the list is exploited on the destination host”, we assume that the
exploitation of each vulnerability is independent, to compute its probability of
exploitation P (c). This is an acceptable approximation since we consider all the
existing vulnerabilities between two topological nodes. Thus, the probability of
exploitation P (c) becomes:
P (c) = P (
∨
i∈{vulnerabilities of as}
ci) = 1−
∏
i∈{vulnerabilities of as}
(1− P (ci))
Breaking cycles in topological attack graphs A TAG is a model defined
globally for a system, containing all potential attacks that can happen. It thus
almost always contains cycles, especially inside local networks in which any host
can attack any other one. For example, a host tn1 may be able to attack an-
other host tn2 that can also attack tn1 (directly or in several steps). A common
assumption to break cycles in attack graphs is that an attacker will not back-
track, i.e., come back on a node he has already successfully exploited. This is
reasonable because backtracking does not bring new information about attack
paths. It has been properly justified by Ammann et al. in [1] and by Liu and
Man in [13]. However, the solutions of the state of the art for Bayesian modelling
of an attack graph such as the ones of Liu and Man [13] and Poolsappasit et
al. [19] use this assumption to delete arbitrary possible attack steps. In reality,
it is impossible to know a priori which path the attacker can choose. Deleting
paths in the Bayesian model thus suppresses actually possible attacker actions.
The only way to break cycles, while keeping all possible paths, is to enumer-
ate all paths, starting from every possible attack source, keeping in the nodes a
memory of the path of the attacker. So, using this memory, we build an acyclic
TAG by ensuring that the paths do not backtrack on already exploited nodes.
For example, a node tn1tn2tn3 means that the attacker controls the node tn3,
having first compromised tn1, then tn2, finally tn3. Unfortunately, this cycle
breaking process causes a combinatorial explosion in the number of nodes of the
model. We discuss in Section 2.6 how we mitigate such limitation.
2.2 Representation of an attack step in BAM
An attack step in the TAG is an edge which is associated with several conditions
and can be related to a detection sensor. In the BAM, we detail the attack
steps, the conditions, and sensors as nodes, in order to model the probabilistic
interactions between such elements, using the nodes detailed below. Each node
represents a boolean random variable with two mutually exclusive states.
Definition 4. A Bayesian topological node btn (tn1, · · · , tnn),
with ∀i, tni ∈ TN (cf. Def. 1), is a node of the BAM representing the random
variable describing the state of compromise of tnn using the path of the topological
attack graph tn1 → · · · → tnn (i.e., Compromised or NotCompromised).
Definition 5. A Bayesian attack step node basn(as), with as ∈ AS
(cf. Def. 1), is a node of the BAM representing the random variable describing
the attack success of as (i.e., Succeeded or Failed).
Definition 6. A Bayesian condition node bcn(c), with c a condition
(cf. Def. 2), is a node of the BAM representing the random variable describing
that the condition c is fulfilled (i.e., Succeeded or Failed).
Definition 7. A Bayesian sensor node bsen(s), with s a sensor (cf. Def. 3),
is a node of the BAM representing the random variable describing the state of
the sensor s (i.e., Alert or NoAlert).
These nodes are linked with edges, indicating that the child node has a
conditional dependency to the state of its parents. For example, a Bayesian
attack step node has a dependency toward its condition(s) and the topological
node from which it may be accomplished. Thus it is the child of the nodes
representing the conditions and the topological node. In the same way, a Bayesian
sensor node is the child of a Bayesian attack step, and a Bayesian topological
node is the child of a Bayesian attack step.
Definition 8. A Bayesian edge e, is a link from a parent node to a child
node that represents a conditional dependency of the child toward its parent.
Appendix A Figure 3 shows the details of the representation of an attack
step from tnn (source) to tnn+1 (target).
2.3 Complete Bayesian Attack Model
Bayesian Attack Tree and Global Model The complete BAM is composed
of a family of Bayesian Attack Trees (BAT), as defined below, each one issued
from one attack source.
Definition 9. A Bayesian Attack Tree is a Bayesian network represented by
BAT(AS, DAG,P) where:
– AS is a special Bayesian Topological Node, the attack source of this BAT.
– DAG(BN,E) is a polytree structure, constituted of
• BN , the Bayesian nodes BN=[btn],[basn],[bcn],[bsen] (cf. Defs. 4-7)
• E, the set of edges E = {e} representing a conditional dependency be-
tween the nodes (cf. Def. 8).
– P is a set of local probability distributions, associated with each node of DAG.
As all nodes are discrete random variables, the local probability distributions
can be specified within a Conditional Probability Table.
To build the whole structure of one BAT of the BAM, we start from a po-
tential attack source of the acyclic TAG. It is the Attack Source and the root
of the BAT. Then, we recursively add the attack steps contained in the acyclic
TAG with the nodes described in Subsection 2.2. To avoid cycles, each attack
step is added, as soon as its target has not been already compromised during the
currently followed path. This can be achieved thanks to the memory of past topo-
logical nodes in Bayesian topological nodes. This building process also ensures
that the graph structure of each BAT is a polytree: a Directed Acyclic Graph for
which there are no undirected cycles either. This allows to use very efficient exact
inference algorithms in the Bayesian network such as Pearl’s algorithm [17].
The complete BAM is constituted of the set of all BATs. As we consider
that each topological node may be a source of attack, the BAM contains exactly
N BAT (i.e., the number of topological nodes in the TAG).
Definition 10. The Bayesian Attack Model BAM({BATi}), is a family of
N Bayesian networks where, for all i in {1..N},BATi is a BAT, whose attack
source is node i in the topological attack graph.
Figure 1 summarises the global architecture of the BAM. In this example, it
is built from a TAG containing 3 nodes and thus is composed of 3 BATs.
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Fig. 1. Bayesian Attack Model Architecture
Consolidation of probabilities As each Bayesian topological node contains
the history of the attack that can lead to this node, many Bayesian topologi-
cal nodes can represent the same topological node in several BATs, when the
attacker used a different path to reach it (e.g. the Bayesian topological node
tn1 → tn2 → tn4 is different from tn2 → tn3 → tn4, even if the attacker has the
control of the same topological node tn4 at the end.).
In the complete BAM, we thus have many Bayesian topological nodes repre-
senting the same asset of the IS. However, what most interests a security operator
is the attacks that are the most likely to compromise his assets. Thus, as output
of the consolidation of probabilities, we assign to a physical asset a probability
of compromise that is the maximum of the probabilities of Bayesian topological
nodes targeting the same asset.
P (TNk) = max
i∈{1..N}
PBATi(TNk)) = max
i∈{1..N}
( max
{∀TN1..TNk−1}
PBATi(TN1, ..., TNk))
2.4 Conditional Probability Tables
We now specify the local probability distribution associated with each node, de-
scribing the probability dependencies of a node toward his parents. As the nodes
are discrete random variables, we can describe the probability dependencies us-
ing conditional probability tables (CPT).
A Bayesian Topological node has one parent for each type of attack that
can be used to compromise it. Its probability table represents a noisy-OR. At
least one succeeded attack step is needed to compromise this node. Even if no
known attack step has succeeded, there is still a little chance that an attack of
this topological node may be an unknown one (e.g. a 0-day). We denote it by
pua. Such a CPT is described in Appendix B Table 1.
An attack step node has two types of parents: (1) one Bayesian topological
node, the source of the attack, required to perform the attack; (2) one or more
Bayesian condition nodes. Depending on the type of attack modelled, the con-
dition nodes may not exist for the attack node. The probabilityNewAttackStep
parameter represents the fact that an attacker may have reached his objective.
Even if he has compromised the topological node and conditions are verified, it
is not certain that he will attempt to propagate through the execution of a new
exploit. We describe in Appendix B Table 2 the CPT of a Bayesian attack node,
for the exploitation of a vulnerability.
A Sensor node has only one parent, the attack node related to the sensor.
Its CPT thus contains only two values and their complement representing the
falsePositive and falseNegative rates attached to the sensor. The CPT of a
Bayesian sensor node is described in Appendix B Table 3.
The attack source of a BAT is a Bayesian topological node without parents.
As such, it does not have a complete CPT, but only a prior probability value
and its complementary. This attackSourceProbability parameter represents the
a priori probability of having an attack issued from this node. It thus has to be
set by the operators, knowing the risk that an attack starts from a topological
node. It can be deduced from a risk evaluation methodology (e.g., ISO 27005 [7]).
In a typical system, a high probability can be set to the Internet (e.g., 0.7), a
medium one to servers in a demilitarised zone (internal subnetwork protected
by a firewall exposing external-facing services on the Internet) (e.g., 0.4), and a
small one for production database servers (e.g., 0.1).
The Attack conditions also do not have any parents. Their probability is
the probability of successful exploitation P (c) associated with the condition. It
highly depends on the type of condition modelled by this node. For example, for
a condition describing the successful exploitation of at least one vulnerability
of a list on a host. The estimation of this probability of successful exploitation
follows the process detailed in Section 2.1, with values for each vulnerability,
coming from the Exploitability Metrics of the CVSS, as explained in Section 2.1.
2.5 Bayesian Attack Model usage
We build our Bayesian Attack Model from the knowledge that the security opera-
tors have about the information system: network topology, known vulnerabilities
and deployed detection sensors. Then, we change the state of the Bayesian sensor
or topological nodes according to the security events received from the sensors:
Sensor Nodes: If the sensor of an attack step exists and is deployed in the
network, as long as it has not issued any alert, all related sensor nodes of the
BAM (that may appear in several BATs) are set to the no alert state. When
the sensor raises an alert corresponding to this attack step, the Bayesian
sensor nodes are set to the alert state. If the sensor also gives an alert
confidence probability, it is possible to set the state alert to this probability.
Topological Nodes: As soon as a compromise information is known for a topo-
logical node, all related Bayesian topological nodes are set to the correspond-
ing state. For example, if a Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) says
that a host is healthy, the related Bayesian topological nodes in all BATs
are set to the not compromised state. Conversely, if the HIDS says that a
host is compromised, the related Bayesian topological nodes are set to the
compromised state. If the HIDS also gives a compromise probability, the
compromised state is set to this probability.
The Bayesian nodes for which there is no compromise information (no de-
ployed sensor, Bayesian attack step nodes and Bayesian condition nodes) are not
set in any state and their probability are updated by the Bayesian inference.
Each time the BAM changes state (when we fix nodes in a different state),
we use a Bayesian network belief propagation algorithm (Lauritzen or Pearl’s
inference algorithm) to update the probabilities of each state at all the nodes.
Then, for each topological node of the topological attack graph, the maximum
probability of the state compromised of all related Bayesian topological nodes,
provides security operators with the probability of the asset being compromised,
as described in Subsection 2.3.
2.6 Model size limitation
Use of a nbSteps parameter to prevent performance issues: The main limitation
when implementing this model is the combinatorial explosion of the number
of nodes, due to the redundancy introduced by the cycle breaking process. In
order to improve the performance and prevent this combinatorial explosion, we
limit the number of successive attack steps added to each BAT , according to a
nbSteps parameter. Thus, we can contain the number of nodes to process in the
BAM, as detailed in Section 3.1.
Impact of the nbSteps parameter on the outputs of the BAM: Thanks to the
redundancy of the model, and as each topological node is an attack source of a
BAT , if some attack steps are discarded in a BAT , they will be in another BAT ,
closer to the BAT attack source. The probabilities of Bayesian topological nodes
in a BAT represent the probability of the attacker exploiting this node starting
from the attack source. As long as no attack has been detected on a path, the
probability of a node compromise decreases rapidly as a function of the length
of the path between the attack source and the node. During initial probability
computation, the probabilities of nodes far from the attack sources are very low.
These probabilities are below the maximum used during the probability consol-
idation detailed in Section 2.3 and do not have any effect on final compromise
probabilities. In that case, the nbSteps parameter has no impact on final results.
The key limitation this parameter introduces is when attacks start being
detected and introduced in a path. More precisely, the limitation arises when
more than two detections are injected in the model. For example, to compute
the combined impact of two detections relative to each other, they need to appear
in the same BAT. The maximum compromise probability of the topological node
related to the first detection will be in the BAT in which it is the attack source.
If the second detection is attached to a node that is more than nbSteps away
(i.e., separated with more than nbSteps− 1 missed detections), it will not be in
the same BAT and these two attacks will be taken into account separately. This
will prevent the increase of probabilities of the nodes between the two detections.
Detections may be separated by other nodes without detections for two reasons:
if there are not enough sensors or if there are false negatives, both undesired
cases. As a summary, the only case when the impact of the limitation of the
BAT depth to nbSteps is significant is when there are more missed detections
than nbSteps− 1 between two successive detections for the same attack. These
assumptions are validated by the experimental validation of Section 3.2.
3 Validation
3.1 Complexity evaluation
The main computation done on each Bayesian Attack Tree of the BAM is the
execution of the belief propagation algorithm (probability inference), computing
the probability of all nodes, according to evidences, nodes set to a specific state.
The complexity of the inference in a Bayesian network is directly linked to the
number of nodes and structure of the network. We estimate the number of nodes
M of a BAT, depending on N , the number of topological nodes in the attack
graph, and k the maximum number of consolidated attack steps between two
topological nodes in the topological attack graph (i.e., the maximum number
of different types of attacks). M is also strongly depending on the existence of
attack steps between the topological nodes. An attack step needs the existence
of at least a vulnerability and of an authorised network access, which depends
totally on the monitored information system. Thus for this complexity evalua-
tion, we consider the worst case: there are k attack steps between each pair of
topological nodes. For each attack step, we add ≈ 4 nodes to the BAM (some-
times few more, according to the number of conditions). Thus, in the worst case,
for each BAT, starting from an attack source, the number of nodes to add is
M ∼ 4×k×(N×· · ·×(N−nbSteps−1)) = 4×k× N !
(N − nbSteps)! = O(N
nbSteps)
The degree of the polynomial curves of the number of nodes in the BAM
increases with the parameter nbSteps. However, even if the number of nodes
in each BAT is high, the Bayesian inference can be done efficiently. Indeed, as
the structure is a polytree, some efficient inference algorithms can be used. For
example, Pearl’s belief propagation algorithm is linear in the number of nodes
[17].
Thus, for each BAT, in the worst case, the complexity of the construction and
probability inference C(BAT ) is C(BAT ) = O(NnbSteps). Finally, for the whole
BAM, as there are at most N attack sources, in the worst case, the complexity
of the inference in the whole model C(BAM) is
C(BAM) = N.C(BAT ) = O(NnbSteps+1)
The calculations on each BAT are independent. So, they may be easily done
in parallel, which gives in practice, C(BAM) = O(NnbSteps) with N processors.
3.2 Experimental use-case-based validation
We will first present a use-case and the scenarios that have been chosen to do
the experimental validation of the BAM, then discuss the results obtained.
Validation scenarios In order to validate the accuracy of the results, while
keeping the scenarios simple for explanations, we implemented a real infrastruc-
ture of 11 virtual machines, for a total of a hundred vulnerabilities. A host (that
will be called host A, thereafter) can be attacked from the Internet, and can
attack the other hosts G to J of its subnetwork. The latter hosts can attack
hosts A, C and D. This network topology is representative of a real informa-
tion system, where an ingress firewall (host K) protects the LAN (E to J), and
where publicly accessible servers are put in a demilitarised zone (A to D). The
topological attack graph used to populate the BAM has been generated from a
report of the vulnerability scanner Nessus, done on this infrastructure.
We apply 6 attack scenarios on this network topology, as summarised in
Appendix C Table 4. The attack is carried out through three attack steps. In
the first scenario, no step is detected; it represents the basic risk of the IT system.
In scenarios 2 to 4, steps are detected and alerts are generated. Scenarios 5 and 6
represent detection anomalies. These scenarios represent the dynamic evolution
of a system with different possible situations:
– Scenarios 1, 2, 3, then 4: Normal evolution of an attack during the time.
– Scenarios 1, 2, then 5: Evolution of an attack in which an attack step cannot
be detected (no sensor for this step).
– Scenarios 1, 2, then 6: Evolution of an attack in which an attack step has
not been detected while there was a sensor for this step.
We assume in these scenarios that the alerts given by the sensors are binary
(alert, noalert), i.e., we do not have alert confidence.
Parameters default values This use-case represents a typical critical IS. It
is managed by a security operator who often uses a vulnerability scanner. Most
vulnerabilities are known, but there is still a chance (e.g., 0.1%) that a very
motivated attacker knows a non-public vulnerability. As the system contains
known unpatched vulnerabilities, sensors are deployed to raise an alert when
one of the vulnerabilities is exploited. These sensors have a medium chance (e.g.,
5%) to raise false positives, when an attack do not succeed while being detected.
However, for the vulnerabilities for which a detection sensor is deployed, the
probability of having a false negative is lower (e.g., 1%). The operator knows that
his system is quite well protected, so it is very unlikely that an attack occurs with
more than 2 undetected steps (e.g., nbSteps can be set to 3). Most attacks may
come from the Internet (e.g., probability of the Internet being a source of attack
of 70%), even if internal hosts may also be a new source of attacks (undetected
phishing, malicious employee, etc.) with a lower probability (e.g., 10%)). Finally,
as valuable machines are not deeply protected (they can be reached in 3 steps
from the Internet), the probability that the attacker propagates through a new
attack step is medium (e.g., 30%). After an attack, he may have already found
what he was looking for. Default values of the parameters used for this use case
are summarised in Appendix D Table 5.
Results and analysis The Bayesian Attack Model was implemented in Java,
using the SMILE Bayesian Network library [4]. The results of the compromise
probabilities of each topological node calculated by the BAM, for each scenario,
are shown in Appendix E Figure 4. The first scenario is the basic risk. The
only host that has a medium risk is the Internet. The other hosts have a not-
significant risk. In the scenarios 2, 3 and 4, the sensors corresponding to the 3
steps attack are set progressively. Each new sensor set as detected confirms the
attack that is currently happening and increases the compromise probability of
the previous and future states. For example, in scenario 4, the Internet, and the
3 victim hosts are in the high-risk zone. In scenario 5, and scenario 6, when there
is a missing detection or a false negative / false positive, the probabilities of an
ongoing attack are lower, but higher than the basic risk, and the probabilities of
scenario 2, that should precede this state. So, a security operator may investigate
the appropriate machines to confirm or disprove the attack.
Parameter sensitivity analysis Several parameters can be customised in the
BAM (cf. Section 3.2). We summarise in Appendix F, Table 6 the results of
the sensitivity analysis of these parameters with the range of variation that we
find appropriate for the given parameters (range of values that may occur in
real-life). The false positives and negatives rates vary from 0 to 30%, because
beyond, their values are meaning-less (e.g., a vulnerability signature with more
30% false positive is useless). The number of successive steps varies from 1 (its
minimum) to 4 (the maximum possible number of successive attack steps for this
use-case). Sources probabilities vary from 0 to 1, as, according to the context, all
values may be possible. The probability of having an exploitation of an unknown
vulnerability is low (15% is a far upper bound). The probability of the attacker
making a new attack step is difficult to estimate. We thus need to study the
impact of this parameter on its whole possible variation interval (0 to 100%).
The most interesting result of this analysis is the ranking influence describ-
ing the impact of the variation of a parameter on the rank of topological nodes
probabilities (on the whole parameter variation range, for the 6 scenarios). This
rank will determine the priorities of security operators in their IS. The probability
influence describes the effect of the variation of the parameters on the absolute
value of the topological nodes probability. The only parameter that has an im-
pact on the rank of the topological nodes probabilities is probabilityOtherHosts.
However, this parameter can be estimated quite accurately with a risk analysis
methodology, which gives the security risk of each topological node, according
to its position in the information system. All other parameters do not have
any effect on the ranking on their whole variation range, which is a comforting
result. Four parameters have a medium impact on the absolute value of the com-
promise probabilities of topological nodes. With a medium uncertainty on such
parameters (e.g., 0.2), the variation of the absolute value of the probabilities is
medium (e.g., up to 0.2). Other parameters have a low impact on absolute val-
ues of probabilities. With a medium uncertainty on such parameters (e.g., 0.2),
the variation of the absolute value of the probabilities is low (e.g., up to 0.02).
So, absolute value of probabilities may be a little impacted by uncertainty on
parameters, but rank is mostly not impacted by the variation of the parameters.
3.3 Performance evaluation
In order to dynamically assess the risk of a system, the BAM has to be evaluated
each time a correlated alert, or a set of correlated alerts is received: the sensors
and topological nodes are set in their new states, then the probabilities are
updated. The duration of such a process needs to be quite fast (around 1 minute
is good), for the operator to properly understand the risk in operational time. We
simulate random network topologies with different parameters (number of hosts,
subnets, vulnerabilities and network services and connectivity between subnets)
to evaluate the performance of the BAM. We generate the TAGs related to the
topologies. Then, we generate random attack scenarios with seven successive
attack steps. Finally, we evaluate the BAM on the different scenarios.
Subnet 1 Subnet 2 Subnet 7
h1.1 h1.2
h1.3
...h2.1 h2.2
h2.3
h3.1 h3.2
h3.3
Fig. 2. Network topology for simulations
We generate random topologies, as depicted in Figure 2, containing from 1
to 70 hosts, in 7 subnets. These topologies are representative of a real network
in which defense in depth is implemented: all the hosts of a subnet have access
to all the hosts of a deeper subnet. In each subnet, all accesses between hosts
are authorized. Each host has 30 random vulnerabilities for a maximum total of
around 2000 vulnerabilities. The results of the duration in seconds of the BAM
generation and the inference after the evaluation of one scenario of 7 successive
attack steps, on these topologies, is displayed in Appendix G Figure 5. The
parameters of the BAM are in the default values detailed in Section 5. This
simulation shows that for medium-sized topologies (up to 70 hosts) the duration
of the Bayesian Attack Model generation and of the inference remains acceptable
(< 1 minute 30 seconds) on a laptop-class computer.
Even if the number of topological nodes of these simulations is limited (70
hosts), it could be extended to much bigger IS, by clustering together identical
templates of servers or of client machines in one topological node, as they possess
the same vulnerabilities and authorised accesses and thus behave in a similar
way in the BAM. Even with 60 assets in the topological attack graph with,
for example, 10 templates of client machines, 30 of network servers, and 20 of
business application servers, it is possible to model a usual big-sized IS.
3.4 Accuracy evaluation
To evaluate the accuracy of the results (i.e., how close the probabilities are to
the truth), we simulate attack scenarios on the random topologies presented in
Section 3.3 and compare the theoretical results with the outputs of the BAM.
The results are shown in Appendix G Figure 6. We compare the theoretical
results known in the scenarios with the results of the BAM. In each scenario, we
know the nodes that are compromised and healthy, i.e., nodes with a theoretical
probability of respectively 1 and 0. Then, we assess if the BAM probabilities of
compromised nodes are close to 1, and if the BAM probabilities of healthy nodes
are close to 0. The plot shows the maximum errors (in terms of distance to the
theoretical values 1 and 0) of compromised and healthy nodes. This figure shows
a large free space between the errors on compromised hosts and the errors on
healthy hosts. This means that if there are no false-positives nor false-negatives
in the detection inputs of the BAM, it allows to distinguish exactly healthy and
compromised hosts, for example with a boundary at the probability of 0.5. So,
there are no false negatives nor false positives introduced by the BAM. The
graphical difference of the results between the values for a low number of hosts
and high number of hosts is probably due to the random attack scenarios that
may be shorter when there are not enough hosts.
4 Related Work
Many people proposed enhancements to improve attack graphs with Bayesian
networks, to use them for dynamic risk assessment [20,13,21]. However, they
do not describe how they manage cycles that are inherent to attack graphs.
In [21], Xie et al. present an extension of MulVAL attack graphs using Bayesian
networks, but they do not mention how to manage the cycle problem, while
MulVAL attack graphs frequently contain cycles. In the same way, in [6], Frigault
and Wang do not mention how they deal with the cycle problem constructing
Bayesian attack graphs. In [13], Liu and Man assert that to delete cycles, they
assume that an attacker will never backtrack. The same assumption is used by
Poolsappasit et al. in [19]. However, they both do not present how they deal with
this assumption to keep all possible paths in the graph, while deleting cycles. We
propose here a novel model that explodes cycles in the building process, keeping
all possible paths while deleting the cycles, to compute the Bayesian inference.
The Bayesian model presented by Xie et al. in [21] is based on logical attack
graphs. It is thus very verbose and can be huge for real information systems.
In [13], Liu and Man’s model is a topological graph, in which are added violation
states. It is thus quite compact, but does not detail the attacks, their conditions
and, mainly, the sensors that can change state. Thus, the only observations that
can be set on this model are observations on topological nodes. The model we
present is a topological model. So, it is much more compact than those based
on logical attack graphs. However, it contains the logical conditions necessary
to carry out the attacks, in order to keep all information important to model
attacks, and add sensor nodes that can be activated with detections. Moreover,
we also add several improvements (attack nodes gathering, polytree structure
of BAT, etc.) that either reduce the size of the graph structure or improve the
performance of the inference. We thus constrain the size of the graph in which
we do Bayesian inference, while conserving all paths by linearising cycles.
The experimental validation we did on the Bayesian Attack Model is on a real
topology of a complexity similar or superior to what was done in the literature
and on simulated topologies that are far bigger than the state of the art. For
example, Xie et al. assess their model on a topology of 3 hosts and 3 vulnerabil-
ities [21], Liu and Man on a topology of 4 hosts and 8 vulnerabilities [13]. The
real world examples used by Frigault and Wang in [6] contain at most 8 vulner-
abilities on 4 hosts. The test network used by Poolsappasit et al. in [19] contains
8 hosts in 2 subnets, but with only 13 vulnerabilities. Thanks to our polytree
model, we successfully run our Bayesian Attack Model efficiently on simulated
topologies with up to 70 hosts for a total of more than 2000 vulnerabilities.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We present in this paper a new Bayesian Attack Model (BAM), representing all
the possible attacks in an information system. This model enables dynamic risk
assessment. It is built from a topological attack graph, using already available
information. Sensor nodes can be activated by dynamic security events to update
the compromise probabilities of topological assets, which rank the risk level of
ongoing attacks. This model handles the cycles that are inherent to attack graphs
and thus is applicable to any information system, with multiple potential attack
sources. The cycle breaking process significantly increases the number of nodes
in the model, but thanks to the polytree structure of the Bayesian networks we
build, the inference remains efficient, for medium information systems. In order
to be able to use the Bayesian Attack Model for bigger information systems,
future work will investigate how the usage of a hierarchical topological attack
graph can be appropriate to build the Bayesian Attack Model.
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A Appendix: Detail of a Bayesian attack step
Figure 3 shows the details of the representation of an attack step from tnn
(source) to tnn+1 (target). It is composed of a Bayesian attack step node that
binds a Bayesian topological node to another one. This Bayesian attack step has
two conditions (bcn1 and bcn2) and a sensor (bsen).
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Fig. 3. Bayesian attack step
B Appendix: Conditional Probability Tables
In this appendix, we detail the conditional probability tables (CPTs) associated
with the nodes of the Bayesian Attack Model. Each node with at least one parent
is associated with a CPT which depends on its type of node. In these tables, the
first lines represent all possible states of the parents. The last lines contain the
probabilities of each state of the child node according to the states of its parents.
Table 1 shows the CPT of a Bayesian topological node, according to the states
of its parents: Bayesian attack step nodes. It represents a noisy OR: an OR with
a small residual probability (the probabilityUnknownAttack parameter).
Bayesian attack step node 1 Succeeded Failed Succeeded Failed
Bayesian attack step node 2 Succeeded Failed
Bayesian topological node
Compromised 1 1 1 pua
NotCompromised 0 0 0 1− pua
with pua = probabilityUnknownAttack.
Table 1. CPT of a Bayesian topological node
Table 2 shows the CPT of a Bayesian attack step node, for the exploitation
of a vulnerability, according to the states of its parents: a Bayesian topological
node and a Bayesian condition node. It represents an AND on the parents with
the probabilityNewAttackStep parameter, when all conditions are fulfilled.
Bayesian topological node Comp NotComp Comp NotComp
Bayesian condition node Succeeded Failed
Bayesian attack step node
Succeeded pnas 0 0 0
Failed 1− pnas 1 1 1
with Comp = State Compromised; NotComp = State NotCompromised;
pnas = probabilityNewAttackStep.
Table 2. CPT of a Bayesian attack step node ”exploitation of a vulnerability”
Finally, Table 3 shows the CPT of a Bayesian sensor node, according to the
state of its parent: a Bayesian attack step node. It represents the potential false
positive and false negative rates of the sensor.
Bayesian attack step node Succeeded Failed
Bayesian sensor node
Alert 1− falseNegative falsePositive
NoAlert falseNegative 1− falsePositive
Table 3. CPT of a Bayesian sensor node
C Appendix: Simulation scenarios
Table 4 shows the detection scenarios applied on the use-case. In the first sce-
nario, no step is detected; it represents the basic risk of the IT system. In sce-
narios 2 to 4, steps I → A, A → G and G → D are progressively detected and
alerts are generated. Scenarios 5 and 6 represent detection anomalies on A→ G
(no sensor information or false negative).
Scenario I → A A→ G G→ D Comment
1 × × × Basic risk
2 X × × First alert
3 X X × Second alert
4 X X X Third alert
5 X O X No information available for the second step (=no sensor)
6 X × X No detection for the second step
Caption I → A: Attack from the Internet to host A; A→ G: Attack from host A to
host G; G→ D: Attack from host G to host D; O: No values set (=no sensor);
X: Sensor node set to alert; ×: Sensor node has been set to noalert.
Table 4. Simulation scenarios
D Appendix: Default values of the parameters
Table 5 presents all the parameters of the Bayesian Attack Model: probabilityUn-
knownAttack, falsePositive, falseNegative, nbSteps, probabilityInternet, probabili-
tyOtherHosts, and probabilityNewAttackStep. Each parameter is associated with
its description and the default value that was chosen for the use-cases.
Parameter
name
Default
value
Meanings Default value explanation
probability-
UnknownAttack
0.001 Probability that an
unknown attack oc-
curs.
Very small probability of having a 0-
day, a unknown vulnerability.
falsePositive 0.05 False positive rate of
each sensor.
Sensors may raise an alert, even if the
attack has not succeeded.
falseNegative 0.01 False negative rate of
each sensor.
This value is smaller as it only concerns
vulnerabilities for which a sensor has
been deployed.
nbSteps 3 Number of successive
attack steps to keep.
Allow to recognise multi-step attacks
with at most 2 missing alerts. C.f. Sub-
section 2.6 for full explanation.
probability-
Internet
0.7 A priori probability
of an attack coming
from the Internet.
The internet is the main source of at-
tacks. Thus, 70% of chances of being
a source of attack, 30% not to be a
source.
probability-
OtherHosts
0.1 A priori probability of
an attack issued from
an internal host.
An internal host may issue an attack.
Thus, 10% of chances of being a source
of attack, 90% not to be a source.
probability-
NewAttackStep
0.3 Probability that the
attack propagates
through a new attack
step.
70% of chance that the attacker does
not continue his attack. He may have
already found what he was looking for.
Table 5. Default values of the parameters used in the BAM
E Appendix: Validation results
Figure 4 shows the results of the BAM for the six scenarios of the use case
presented in Subsection 3.2. Markers represent hosts of the topology, and the
ordinate is their compromise probability in the abscissa scenario. The horizontal
lines give some idea of the threshold that could be taken to define the compromise
risk level of the hosts. For example, the hosts under the lowest line (probability ≤
0.25) have a not-significant risk of being compromised, above the lowest line
(0.25 < probability ≤ 0.50) have a low risk, above the second line (0.50 <
probability ≤ 0.75) have a medium risk, and above the upper line (0.75 <
probability) have a high risk of being compromised.
For readability of the results, the hosts having the same value (more or less 10−10) for
all the scenarios have been grouped on one point, and the points are spread around
the scenario number.
Fig. 4. Results for each scenario
F Appendix: Parameters sensitivity analysis results
Table 5 summarises the sensitivity analysis of the parameters of the Bayesian
Attack Model. We give in this table the range of variation that we find appro-
priate for the parameters. Then, we study the influence of each parameter in its
whole variation range on the ranking between the compromise probability of the
hosts, and on the value of the probabilities.
Name Variation
range
Ranking in-
fluence
Proba influ-
ence
Comment
falseNegative [0.0− 0.3] No impact Almost no im-
pact
falsePositive [0.0− 0.3] No impact Medium
impact in
scenarios
3, 4 and 5
(decrease)
Impact for low values (between 0
and 0.05). Effect amplified by the
number of detections set.
nbSteps [[1− 4]] No impact Medium
impact in
scenarios 4, 5
and 6
Parameter sensitive particularly
for scenarios that contain attacks
longer than nbSteps.
probability
Internet
[0.0− 1.0] No impact
(except the
Internet)
Little impact
(increase)
Probability of hosts attacked di-
rectly from the Internet increases
with the increase of this parameter.
probability
OtherHosts
[0.0− 1.0] Medium Im-
pact (different
probability
growth curve)
Medium
impact (in-
crease)
Probability of all hosts (except the
Internet) increase with the increase
of such parameter. Stronger in-
crease for hosts attackable from
many hosts.
probability
NewAttack
[0.0−0.15] No impact
(except the
Internet)
Low impact
(increase)
With the increase of this parameter,
the probability of attackable hosts
increases slowly, as it is more prob-
able that they are attacked, using
attacks that are not known and can-
not be detected.
probability
NewAttack-
Step
[0.0− 1.0] No impact Medium im-
pact (increase
then decrease,
maximum
around 0.3)
When this parameter is small (in-
crease from 0 to 0.3), the param-
eter represents that even if an at-
tack is possible, it may not happen.
Then (decrease from 0.3 to 1) it rep-
resents that even if an attacker has
compromised a host, he may not do
another attack.
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis of the parameters of the BAM
G Appendix: Performance and evaluation results
Figure 5 presents the results of the duration in seconds of the Bayesian Attack
Model generation and the inference after the evaluation of one scenario of 7
successive attack steps, on random simulated topologies from 1 to 70 hosts.
Fig. 5. Duration in seconds, according to the number of hosts
Figure 6 presents the results of an accuracy evaluation of the BAM on random
simulated topologies. The curve with triangles represent the mean and standard
deviation, during 10 simulations, of the minimum probability of the hosts known
as compromised. The curve with circles represent the mean and standard devi-
ation, during 10 simulations, of the maximum probability of the hosts known
as healthy. In other words, this graph shows the maximum errors (in terms of
distance to the theoretical values 1 and 0) of compromised and healthy nodes.
Fig. 6. Accuracy of the results of the BAM according to the number of hosts
